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1. Utah Code Annotated Section 76-6-501 
APPELLANT BRIEF 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from a jury verdict finding the Appellant guilty of two counts of Forgery, third 
degree felonies after a jury trial with the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield presiding. The Appellant was 
tried in the First District Court of Box Elder County, one day jury trial - November 10, 1998. 
On June 9, 1997, the Appellant was sentenced to two 0-5 terms in the Utah State Prison, 
sentences to run concurrent. Said prison sentences were stayed and Appellant was placed on 
probation. Jurisdiction to hear the above-entitled appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 78-2-2(3)(I) (1953 as amended) and Rule 26 of the Utah rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I The Trial Court erred in denying Defendants Motion for New Trial. 
Standard of Review 
When a party challenges a trial court's denial of a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict or a new trial on appeal and bases that challenge on a claim that there was insufficient 
evidence to support the verdict, we follow one standard of review: We reverse only if, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, we conclude that the evidence is 
insufficient to support the verdict. 
839 P.2d 828, Heslop v. Bank of Utah, (Utah 1992) 
Excerpt from page 839 P.2d 839 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. CONSTITUTION AMEND. VI: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed 
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
U. S. CONSTITUTION AMEND. XIV Section 1: All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION ART. I Section 7: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION ART. I Section 12: hi criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusations against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confront^ by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense 
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights 
herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall 
not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-6-501 
A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is 
facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any 
writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, 
transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent 
or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other 
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than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or transmission, or 
any other method of recording valuable information including forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, and any other 
symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by a government or 
any agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an 
interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any person or 
enterprise. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD 
Appellant was charged by the State of Utah with two counts of forgery, third degree felonies 
on August 2, 1997. R 1. The Honorable Judge Ben H. Hadfield appointed attorney Candace 
Bridgess as Appellants coimsel on December 10, 1997. R 16. 
Appellant's case was tried to a jury on November 10, 1998. R 40. Appellantwasconvicted 
of two counts of Forgery, third degree felonies. R 69. Sentencing was scheduled for December 15, 
1998. R 70. On December 15, 1998, sentencing was continued due to lack of a Presentence Report. 
Attorney Ronald Perkins entered his appearance as counsel for Appellant. R 73. Appellant was 
sentenced on December 21, 1998 to two 0-5 terms in the Utah State Prison. Said prison sentence 
was stayed and Appellant was placed on probation and ordered to serve one year in jail with possible 
release after a mental health examination days in jail with credit for 31 days previously served. 
Appellant was further ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $1850.00. R 81,82. 
On December 29, 1998 Appellant filed a Motion for New Trial. R 85. Oral arguments were 
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held on January 25, 1999. R. 109. The Honorable Ben H. Hadfield issued a Memorandum Decision 
on February 4, 1999 denying Appellants motion for new trial. R 109,110, 111. Appellant filed an 
appeal on February 12, 1999 pro se. R. 114. 
ARGUMENTS 
ISSUE 1: The trial Court Erred in Denying Defendants Motion for New Trial based 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Insufficiency of Evidence and Failure to provide and 
Instruction Concerning Intent 
First, the Trial Court erred in denying Appellants request for new trial based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel and insufficiency of counsel. During the course of the trial the State called its 
primary investigating witness Officer Scott Cosgrove relating to an interview with Appellant. R 153 
P.2 Officer Cosgrove testified as follows: 
A: I asked him where he received the checks. He told me a story about somebody that 
owed him money for some work. I said, well, who gave you the chebks and he could 
not give me the persons name. I asked him about the names on the checks. 
Q. Let's go through that very methodically. Tell the jury exactly what you asked him 
regarding the names. 
A. OK. I went through each name on the checks. I said do you know David Henrie? He 
said no. 
Q. OK 
A. I asked him do you know a Barbara Pledger and he said no. I asked him do you know 
Elizabeth Workman and he said no. 
Q. And that's on the second check, right? 
A. Yes. I asked him if he knew a William Mercer and he said no. I asked him why and he 
says, well some friend owed me money for doing some work. I asked him who these 
friends are so I could contact them. He said that he could no recall their names. I said, 
well, where can I locate these friends. He come up with a story that they fish on the river 
there in Corinne. I could possible locate them there. 
Q. Okay, so if I have your story right, every name on those checks he could not - - he didn't 
recognize, correct? 
A. Yes. 
R 153 P. 9-10 
In addition to such testimony, the State argued to the jury the Appellant signed his name to 
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all the checks. Such testimony was unrebutted by any other witness nor by the Appellant who did 
not take the stand. 
Defendant's new counsel filed a Motion for New Trial and attached thereto a forensic report 
by John Dewayne Moyes, a Questioned document examiner. R. 87-97 Mr. Moyes stated Appellant 
probably did not produce the writing on the front of the checks but did sign his name to the back of 
the checks. 
The Honorable Judge Ben H. Hadfield ruled in the Memorandum Decision 
The first assertion is that the State presented testimony from Officer Cosgrove 
to the effect that defendant admitted writing the checks in question, which were 
identified at trial as Exhibits 1 and 2. Defendant now argues that a handwriting expert 
should have been procured to offer evidence indicating the defendant did not write 
those checks. An analysis of the prosecution's evidence will show that the 
prosecution witness did not claim that defendant wrote the checks. Rather, he 
claimed that defendant "admitted writing the checks." Officer Cosgrove never offered 
his opinion as to whether the defendant actually wrote the checks. 
The defendant was charged with to counts of forgery. Under the law, it is not 
necessary that the State prove the defendant wrote the checks. In examining Exhibits 
1 and 2, even an untrained observer would conclude that the faces of the checks were 
not written by the same person who endorsed ccKevin A. Bosley" on the back of the 
checks. The opinion now proffered by the defense that a forensic expert has 
concluded defendant '^ probably did not produce the writing on the front of the checks 
is unremarkable. There is no evidence to suggest this jury concluded the defendant 
wrote the front of the checks. The jury did not need to even decide that issue. The 
jury was made well aware of that through the questions which were issued by the jury 
and the answers provided. The jury's second question was, 'What does it mean to 
utter a check?" The response given to the jury was "utter means to put or send into 
circulation" (as a check of, for example, putting into circulation is uttering a check). 
Trial defense counsel's decision not to secure an expert regarding handwriting 
samples was sound and did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. R. 109-
110 
The Trial Court concluded in his memorandum decision that all the jury had to decide was that 
Appellant uttered a check which proved to be fraudulent. 
However, in State v. Windward. 909 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1995) this Court ruled 
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. . .the law does not conclusively presume that because a person signed the name of 
another a forgery has occurred. The act of signing another's name without permission 
does not constitute forgery unless it was done with the intent to defraud. > Turner, 
282 P.2d at 1047. Accordingly, to sustain a conviction for forgery, there must be a 
sufficient connection between the act of forgery and the intent to defraud. See > 
Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385, 390 (Colo. 1982) (en banc) (stating that "in 
order to subject a person to criminal liability for a felony or serious misdemeanor, 
there must be a concurrence of an unlawful act (actus rea) and a culpable mental state 
(mens rea)") (emphasis added), cert, denied, > 459 U.S. 1225, 103 S.Ct. 1232 (1983). 
In establishing the nexus between the intent and the act," '[t]he law can presume the 
intention so far as realized in the act, but not an intention beyond what was so 
realized.' " > State v. Castonguay, 663 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1983) (quoting 
Thackerv. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 767, 114 S.E. 504, 
505 (1922)). Moreover, even if a defendant possesses both an intent to defraud and 
commits the act of signing another's name without authority, a forgery conviction 
cannot be sustained unless the act was done in furtherance of the intention. Stated 
another way, a defendant who has signed another's name without permission, while 
possessing an intent to defraud that is completely unrelated to the unauthorized 
endorsement, has not committed forgery. 
909 P.2d 909, State v. Winward, (Utah App. 1995) 
Excerpt from pages 909 P.2d 912-909 P.2d 913 
The Trial Court made no mention of any specific intent to defraud anyone in the trial. As 
stated in Windward 
To commit forgery, one must possess the specific intent to defraud "anyone." > Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-501 (1995). See > State v. Turner, 3 Utah 2d 285, 288, 282 P.2d 1045, 1047 (1955) 
(Crockett, J., 
909 P.2d 909, State v. Winward, (Utah App. 1995) 
Excerpt from page 909 P.2d 912 
From the questions asked by the jury, and the memorandum decision of the Trial Court, the 
jury concluded that merely because Appellant uttered a fraudulent check, he was guilty of fraud. 
Appellant's trial counsel did not request an instraction concerning specific intent. This 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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Further, attached to Appellant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial, there is 
an Affidavit of Appellant. R. 98 (attached hereto and marked Exhibit "A"). Appellant asserts the 
statements made in that affidavit constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Based on the decision in Windward, trial counsel was ineffective, there was insufficient 
evidence to support a conviction, and the Trial Court erred in not granting Appellant a new trial. 
The second issue in the Trial Court's memorandum decision is whether failure to provide an 
instruction concerning intent constituted ineffective assistance. 
The Trial Court stated in the memorandum decision 
The Court has reviewed the instructions and concludes that the jury was 
properly and sufficiently instructed concerning intent. The second question posed by 
the jury and response provided as follows: 
Jury Question: Did Kevin Bosley have to physically write and sign the 
names of the other people on the checks to be found guilty or does he just have to be 
aware that they were forged? 
Response: The State must only prove those elements identified in 
Instruction 5 and Instruction 5. 
Instruction 4 and 5 were the elements for counts one and two, the t w » 
separate forgery charges. The third element, in each of those accounts, stated the 
following: "did, with a purpose to defraud." 
Defense counsel now argues that there is no indication to the jury that the 
defendant must have intended to defraud. Black's Law Dictionary Revised Fourth 
Edition, defines "intent" as follows: 
"Intent. Intent in legal sense is purpose to use particular means to effect 
certain result. . .meaning purpose, signification, intendment," 
Blacks Law Dictionary further defines "purpose and "purposely" as follows: 
'"Purpose. That which one sets before him to accomplish; an end, intention, or 
aim. . ." 
'Purposely. Intentionally, designedly, consciously. . . . " 
The words intent and purpose are used to define each other. The Court 
concludes that they are, therefore, for the purposes of this offense and these 
instructions synonymous. The jury was properly instructed concerning intent. R. 
109-110. 
Basically, the Trial Court ruled that because the instructions contained the words "did, "with 
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a purpose to defraud," the jury was properly instructed concerning intent. The Trial Court stated that 
intent and purpose define each other. However, the jury did not have the advantage of the language 
of Black's Law Dictionary in the instructions. Further, if the Trial Court felt it necessary to explain 
the definition of purpose to Appellant's new counsel why was there no need to explain the same to 
the jury. 
The only instruction concerning intent besides the elements of the crime as listed in instruction 
4 and 5 (attached hereto as Exhibit "B") is instruction 7 (attached hereto as Exhibit "B"). Instruction 
7 gives definitions of both intentionally and knowingly. 
In State v. Windward, there was a similar situation. In Windward this Court stated 
In the instant case, the court instructed the jury that to find defendant guilty it must 
conclude that he acted "knowingly and intentionally, . . .with a purpose to defraud 
anyone, or with knowledge that he was facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by 
anyone." The court defined '"knowingly" and "intentionally" . (Instruction No. 13 
defined these terms as follows: A person engages in conduct "intentionally" or with 
intent, when it is that person's conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct 
or cause the result. A person engages in conduct "knowingly" or with knowledge, 
when the person is aware that the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result; 
from footnote 10 State v. Windward) in terms of general criminal intent and defined 
"purpose to defraud" as "simply a purpose to use a false writing as if it were genuine 
in order to gain some advantage." 
In the present action, the Trial Court defined intent with almost precisely the same general 
criminal intent definition. See Instruction 7 attached hereto and marked Exhibit "B". 
This Court went on to state in Windward 
The problem with the instructions, as given, is that they "failed to explain adequately 
the distinction between the general and specific intent requirements or relate those 
requirements to the facts ofthe case." > State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981) 
(emphasis added). Absent an instruction that carefully and precisely defined specific 
intent to defraud-and, most importantly, conveyed to the jury that, based on the facts 
of this case, the only person that defendant could possibly have intended to defraud 
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when he endorsed Nicole Packer's name on the check was Nicole Packer-the jury 
lacked the proper framework within which it could meaningfully evaluate the 
necessary elements of the crime charged. 
Had the court correctly instructed the jury on the need to find a specific intent to 
defraud, it might well have minimized the confusing and misleading effects of the 
problematic evidence by narrowly focusing the jury on the pivotal issue in the case 
By the same token, if the evidence was well-focused, making clear that if defendant 
intended to defraud anyone by his unauthorized endorsement it would have to have 
been Packer, the jury instructions could have been less precise. Instead, however, the 
trial court may well have compounded the jury's likely confusion by admitting 
evidence concerning defendant's wrongdoings allegedly perpetrated against the 
Bauers, Bassett, ERA Realty, and Mountain America Credit Union, yet refusing to 
instruct the jurors that they could not base a conviction for forgery upon these 
separate theories of fraud that occurred, if at all, by means other than defendant's 
endorsing Packer's check without her permission. Accordingly, against the backdrop 
of the confusing evidence presented, we hold that the court erred by not sufficiently 
instructing the jury on the concept of specific intent as it applied to the facts of this 
case. 
909 P.2d 909, State v. Winward, (Utah App. 1995) 
Excerpt from page 909 P.2d 914 
In the present action, there was obviously confusion by the jury as to what exactly constituted 
intent. Based on the decision in Windward by this Court, the jury was improperly instructed and this 
case should be remanded to the Trial Court and Appellant should be granted a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on Appellant's Trial Counsel's failure to requests a specific intent instruction, 
Appellant's affidavit attached to the Memorandum in Support of New Trial, and the inadequate jury 
instructions in Appellant's trial, the Appellant was improperly convicted of two counts of forgery, 
and Appellant should be granted a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this /J? day of March, 2000. 
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JUS/TIN C. BOND 
torney for Appellant 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
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CER I MCA IE OF MA II ING 
I hereby ,\*vi jfy I mailed a two true and correct copy of Appellant's Brief to the following. 
Christine Solti 
Assistant Auornev Uenerai 
160 E 300 S. #600 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, I I I 84011 
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Attorneys for Defendant '"' ' ' 
Bamberger Square, Building I 
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. N H - ?RST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURi . * - • 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, / 
Plaintiff, / MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
/ OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
vs. / 
/ 
! M N A. HOSLE Y," _ / CaseNo.971100120 FS 
1 )efendant, / Judge: Ben Hadfield 
COMES NOW, the Defendant KEVIN A. BOSLEY - r i ;, 
RONALD W, PERKINS, in support of his rn.ot.ion for a new trial does oifei v.\x following 
enioniiiidiirn ufPoints arul Auilioiiiics. 
POINT 1 
THE STATE PRESENTED TESTIMONY FROM OFFICER SCOTT COSGROVE 
REGARDING HANDWRITING THAT APPEARED ON THE CHECK 
j^l during the course of the ti: ia 1 the State called its pi ii iiai: 3 • investigating w itness 
Officer Scott Cosgrove relating to his interview of the Defendant Kevin Bosley 
'(hiit l Mln.vi i osgKF v tndiiiitetJ IIIIIT leading (lie 1  iclemJanl Ins Mjianda rights he waived 
those rights and agreed to talk with Mm on July 31, 1997. 
Officei Cosgrove testified as follows: 
A: I asked him where he reccr ^ tl: -1M :!-;?. He told me a 
story about somebody that owec r:v. :;• ,o for some work. I 
said, well, who gave you the checks and he -:ouid not give me the 
persons name. I asked him about the names on the checks. 
\l 
A ^ t > 
Q: Let' 's go through that »c: --* \ y 
exactly what you asked him regard VJ [ * a 
A: OK. I went through each name on the checks. I said do 
you know a David Henrie? He said no. 
Q: OK 
A: I asked him do you know a Barbara Pledger and he said 
no. I asked him do you know Elizabeth Workman and he said no. 
Q: And that's on the second check, right? 
A: Yes. I asked him if he .knew a William Mercer and he said 
no. I said who put these names on the checks and he says I did. 
I asked him why and he says, well, some friend owed me money 
for doing some work. I asked him who these friends are so I 
could contact them,... He said that he could not recall their names. 
I said, well, where can I located these friends. He come up with 
a story that they fish on the river there in Corin ne I could 
possibly locate them there. 
Q: Okay, so if I have your story right,, every nan ic on those 
checks he could not - - he didn't recognize, correct? 
A: That's true, 
Q: And yet he stated, that he put every one of those names on 
both, of those checks? . 
Ai Yes 
TRANSCRIPT 9-10 
The forgoing testimony of Officer Scott Cosgrove appears in the transcribed testimony 
::i\u-c. Court Re * . . .ucd herein 
.• reference. ' • 
On payc 12 of the transcript of Scott Cosgrove's testimony, lie also testified that Kevin 
Bosley told him that he signed all of thr ^ ' ~. i 
In addition to such testimony, ihe State through .is pmsecuting attorney argued :. the 
J\ VM< «-]Si as outlined from I he tesfiinoin ofSnjif POSLMIUU:' llial lliu Delendanl sur.tv .;. ^e 
names to the checks as was testified to by Scott Cosgrove 
^ '-• •• v< -^  wasunrebu;iv*w - u\* ^>nc; vvihk ^ i^ ..! by Liie Defendant who was not 
called as a witness. 
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^•"eliminary hearing and police reports but made no effort to secure any forensic evidence 
'.yarding the handwriting on the "forged" checks. 
p^er the ^ al, Defendant' s mother secured the services of Defendant * s pi e sent coi insel 
whose first consideration was securing forensic evidence showing that the checks in fact were 
mill vvtiUtTi by Kevin Basin; and IIMI II'H* sigiidliiics nil I he i lit\I wen," noil si mi in] I > \' Iscvin 
Bosley. Defendant asserts such evidence and information was and is critical to the proceeding 
against him and should have been presented to the jury. 
Defendant's new counsel attaches herew ith a foi ensic i epoi I: b) J olii: 11)1' > -ayne ft Io> es, 
" Ouestior Document Examiner Ohviouslw ^ c i ••••<: .estimonv bears upon the facts 
'-"•• .' ' - . * ' , : . , ..^  • . . - . : : : inanu; ; : , , C . , U . ,;;, oStimoiiy of 
Officer Scott Cosgrove who testified that the Defendant signed the names of the other persons 
on the check. 
jrUUYl'2 
CONSIDERATION OF JURY STATEMENTS ARE IRRELEVANT IN THIS 
COURT DISCUSSION WITH THE JURY POST CONVICTION AS TO THIER 
DETERMINATION IN FINDINS MUST BE TOTALLY DISCOUNTED IN RULING 
UPON THIS MOTION FOR A NEW T l 1 41 
When the Defendant appeared for sentencing on December 17 1 (>(W a I. vussi. HI W as 
•: -ii v<:' he record wherein Defendant would be filing a Motion for a new trial in part based upon 
iorensic evidence lelalim' in (IK,1 hiindwiiliiuvs ilia! iippc.nul in ihi initial clu't II- s 
The Court indicated at that time that it had conversed with the jury after its verdict and 
ome jui y member s had indicated to the Court it was their decision to convict the Defendent 
vvcnthoi igh they did not find that the Defendant signed the names of nil the per1 ons HI I lie i heck 
3 
- >«. - * - a:.gni na\c a tearing on whether or not Defendant filed a Motion for 
. . New Trial. 
Defendant is extremely concerned that the Court's conversation, with the jury after its 
•
 ],Vl ivill allnl lh(k f "(Hint 'f MIIIIUJ, in fuJinij mi Dcfeniidiil \ Molnni lor a IILMV linal loi such 
:• urination is by Rule not permissible in ruling upon or addressing a Motion for A New Trial. 
I'IK1 I'I isis lot Defendant's extreme concern is addressed in State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1 
VwU*i. > ^ . wherein the Court of Appeals in disnisshi[j JUIOI aflicLi\ 11 s held iv ' Ikm 
"Rule 606 Cr) of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows testimony on 
the question of 'whether any outside influence was improperly 
brought to bear upon any juror'. However, Rule 6060 (b) 
provides that evidence by Affidavit will not be admitted as to 'any 
matter or statment ocuring during the course of the jurors 
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other 
jurors mind or emotions as influencing the juror' 
All inquires into the thought processes of the jurors are improper 
because they undermine the integrity of the verdict. State v. 
Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 248n.4 (Utah 1992); State v. Gee, 28 
' Asi: 1996, 498 P.2d 662, 665-67 (1,97,2) 
Rulr H""r essentially thereby provides thai I he though processes of the jury in reaching 
a verdict are totally irrelevant and totally inadmissableyt/r an . *•//.-• v. 
The only exception is when theu '- a question molvmg extraneous prejudicial 
mlnf niation MI nutsidi1 influence bciiij., (tiotighl In I >eai against an> IUFOI Neither ot I hose 
exceptions apply in this case and therefore the jury's thought processes are iuelevent and by rule 
inadmissable. " • ' . 
Neifie 'he State nu the Defendant are permitted under Rule 6i¥t n.f tl^ I litjh R\\\w nf 
=•. vidcncc oi .. \ eseniing for consideration, affidavits of jurors as to thier thought processes and the 
' " -' *
 s
 i those ^aijic IhoujL'ht piueesses must out of necessity be 
4 
.tally disregarding in maintaining the integrity of the ci iminal justice system.. 
This Court must therefore toiaih sr» ^M- • - fr. :*:^  *V iisregard all statments made 
by any of the jurors after the Dclenasni s convictu - ?^s K> essential to insuring that 
I tefendant l Mntinn for a urn liml is based soldv upon illmr nM idem c llha! was pirsenk-. • ^e 
trial and which appears on the record 
Consequently, the objectiv ity of the Court must be solely limited ot the facts presented 
ai tfmi an(j those facts are that the State'* ^-r--.*rii •* ^ : ^v*- *ut 
defendant told him, he (Kevin Bosley) told him he put the names of William Mercer, Elizabeth 
-.man, Haiku a Pledgei on tl le checks when he cllclii t kno1 * them and did so because "some 
^icmi owed me money for doing some work". 
To allow such testimony without Defendant's public defender attorney doing anything 
cousel. 
POINT 3 
DKKKNDANTASSER1 * HIS PUBLIC DEFENDER ATJORNR VI AS 
INEFFECTIVE 
In addition to not securing an expert to testify regarding the handwriting samples which 
1
 iculd have been done by a I\ lotion to the Court to appoint an Expert, with the County being 
s^ponsible ^,c^ *he ^^ ;-> ne^ as the lack of time spent in preparation by Defendant's Public 
. :-•:; -... .> ancctiy upon her inefFectivness as Defendant's counsel. 
Defendant's public defende . . . , , .
 s 
Robinson or if she did make any effort to secure his attendance the night: before trial it was too 
te tc » do si :> and illusti ates the Pi iblic Defender' s lack of attention to an integral pai I of 
5 
Defendant s defense. 
There does not appear to be in the Court file any evidence of any subpoenas issued on 
behalf of the Defendant despite the absolute necessity of pi esenting ev idence as to how and from 
whom the Defendant received the two "forged" checks. 
To offer no explanation as to how these two checks were received or the circumstances 
L'tntanioinil in 'Vnnvk'l mi:" 
During the deliberations of the jury it appears that two questions were presented bj the 
jury. I hat the second question and response thereto are as follows: 
JURY QUESTION ; Did Kevin Bosley have to physically write 
and sign, the names of the other people on the checks to be found 
guilty or does he just have to be aware that they were forged? 
RESPONSE: I he State must only prove those elements ' 
identified in Instn iction 4 and Instruction 5 
That Instructions #4 and #5 are elements for Count I and Count II, the two separate 
;-•- - ' ~ :•.: ^nons #4 and ': wO not provide thai the State must prove intent beyond 
i* xv^ iiSonablc UuuDi. 
U.C.A 76-2-101 relating to culpability provides that no person is guilty of an offense 
1. He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly with criminal 
negligence or with a mental state otherwise specified in ihe 
statute defining the offense, as the defmitior of *he r fierce 
requires; oi 
2. His acts constitute an offense imvlvim* stric* liab'htv 
Instruction number - ;.,.*: wa>> ^\ e., .- • is, ,~; - u.i:i)^ iiueniiOiially and knowingly but 
iails to instruct the jury tV;* l- --^ ~% -. -.-• -• - *\ > .< ' i -. . • ^ • . > 
6 
innlniiY lo I , "C" ^  i ^ - 'Mn l . 
Such jury instruction should have provided that the Defendant, Kevin A. Bosle> did 
"intentionally or knowingly with the purpose to defraud'' • 
The failure to include a mental state in the elements of the offense is a n latter of law 
erroneous. This becomes particularly significant in light of the jury's second question wherein 
ill*- response v r "nnly tlmw difiiciih uluililinl i mistnit huii HA tiiiii iiistitjcln mii'i1 S i™1m *! he 
proven by the state". 
Consequently, the jury was again not informed that the act (of Kevin Bosley) to defraud 
be done intentionally or knowingly 
Defendant asserts ins public deferder's failui < 10 ~ squire criminal culpabilin under - *-I-
- ., .- i.enses consi.i xu .:o::u.ivt counse. * did her not 
•requiring intent to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in the answ, * . - / . . - r 
question.. 
SllIMMAKY 
Defendant asserts the failure of Ms public defender to consult with.him and prepare for 
al, to si lbpoeana witnesses, the failure to secure expert forensic testimony and her failure to 
* licli a new trial should be granted. 
'an* *A:I> improper and should be totally discounted b;y the Court in ruling upon Defendant's 
CONCLUSION 
7 
Wherefore, Defendnat prays that this Court set aside the prior convictions and that 
Defendant he afforded hi; nppui'luiiils In present evident <• 'villi llic iissMuiur nf efliilive 
mnsel. 
I 
RONALD W PERKINS 
Attorney al Law 
CERli •••'>• *i -. : , - G 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and corrcci c i -\ o; the foregoing Affidj\ it. postage 
prepaid, addressed as follows: John Serge, Depuu bo\ !.lde: County Attorne) ^ - . ^ .1 
Main Street, Brigham City, Utah 84302 /Z^Ur-f ? 
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CURRICULUM VITAE 
JOHN D. MOYES 
OCCUPATION: Criminalist / Forensic Consultant / Investigator, 
Perform Investigations, Accept physical evidence 
and using scientific techniques, examine and 
evaluate such evidence, produce reports and testify 
as required in legal proceedings regarding the 
evidence or investigation• 
EDUCATION: 
B.S Degree from Weber State University, Ogden, 
Utah. 
Advanced Homicide Investigation School (Post) 
Internship Southwest Institute of Forensic 
Science/Medicolegal Investigation of Death 
United States Secret Service Academy 
• FBI Fundamentals of Questioned Document Examination 
For Laboratory Personnel 
FBI Fingerprint schools for latent print examiners 
• Arizona State Division of International Association 
of Identification "Crime Scene and Latent Print 
Identification Techniques11 
• Educational seminars sponsored by Forensic 
Organizations at least once each year 
Have received training at local and state crime 
laboratories in Utah, Arizona and Nevada 
EXPERIENCE: 
Employed as Criminalist/Questioned Documents 
Examiner at the Northern Utah Criminalistics 
Laboratory from 1987 to 1993 
• Supervisor of the Weber County Technical Services 
Unit of the Crime Laboratory 
Instructor for the Utah Peace Officers Standards 
and Training (Death Investigation) 
Instructor Criminal Justice Department Weber State 
University 
• Testified in Federal, circuit and District Courts 
in Utah, Idaho and Wyoming for both prosecution and 
defense 
• Taught classes for Air Force OSI and other law 
enforcement groups 
• Forensic Documents Examiner private practice since 
1978 
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: 
Member American Academy Of Forensic Sciences 
1995 appointed to Board of Directors Private 
Investigators Association of Utah 
• 1996 Elected V.P. Investigative Services PIAU 
FORENSIC DEVELOPMENT 
& RESEARCH LABORATORIES 
290 EAST 1400 SOUTH BOUNTIFUL, UTAH 84010 
(801) 292-8852 
December 14,1998 
Ron Perkins 
205 26th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
As per your request, I contacted Mr Kevin Bosley at the Box Elder County Jail, Brigham City, 
Utah and obtained from him a handwriting sample. 
On December 10, 1998, additional handwriting was obtained from your office by way of course of 
business writings as listed below. Also obtained at this time were two pages of photocopied 
documents as listed: 
QUESTIONED: 
1. Photocopy of check 3019 dated 6/21 /97 drawn on account of Foxmoor 
Apartments in the amount of $5,000.00 signed Barbra Pledger and endorsed David 
Henrie and Kevin A. Bosley. 
2. Photocopy of check 236 dated 4 July 1997 drawn on account of William J. Mercer 
in the amount of $250.00 signed William Mercer and endorsed Elizabeth Workman 
and Kevin A. Bosley. 
KNOWN: 
1. Standard handwriting of Kevin A. Bosley as found in the following documents: 
a. Six pages of handwriting provided in the presence of this examiner. 
b. Twenty-three canceled checks drawn on account of Kevin A. Bosely dating 
from August 17, 1993 to September 4,1993 and including check numbers 
227,228, 229, 230, 231,232, 233, 234,236, 237,238, 239,240, 242, 
251, 252, 253,254, 255, 256, 257, 258 and 259. 
A l 
Within the limitations imposed by the examination of reproductions rather than original 
documents, the following qualified opinion is given: 
It is the opinion of this examiner that the writer of the K-1 exemplars probably did not produce 
the front portion of Item Q-l. It is also probable that the writer of K-1 did not produce the David 
Henrie endorsement as found on the back of Q-l. The writer of K-1 is identified as the writer of 
the Kevin A Bosley endorsement as found on the back of Q-l. 
The writer of K-1 probably did not produce the writing on the front of Item Q-2. Due to the 
quality of the Elizabeth Workman endorsement together with the presence of line quality 
distortion, the author can not be determined at this time. If, however, the endorsement is the 
genuine writing of the author and not an attempt to disguise or simulate the signature, then the 
Elizabeth Workman endorsement was probably produced by someone other than the writer of 
K-1. The Kevin A Bosley endorsement as found on Q-2 was produced by the writer of K-1. 
If you have any questions or if I can be of further assistance, please let me know. 
Sincerely; 
/P "777^ 
i D. Moyesr 
Questioned Document Examiner 
\? jTr\TT 
r-
^ 2 9 / l i - | | 0 : , | 
RONALD W. PERKINS, #2568 of 
FARR, KAUFMAN, SULLIVAN, GORMAN, 
JENSEN, MEDSKER, NICHOLS & PERKINS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Bamberger Square, Building 1 
205 26th Street, Suite 34 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-5526 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEVTN A. BOSLEY, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT 
Case No.971100120 FS 
Judge: Ben Hadfield 
:SS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:  
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
KEVTN A. BOSLEY, being first duly sworn upon his oath deposes and states as follows: 
1. That I am the Defendant in the above entitiled matter. 
2. That I was indigent and represented by Candace S. Bridgess, Public Defender for 
Box Elder County. 
3. That I furnished the name of James Robinson to said attorney as the person from 
whom I received the checks as well as the circumstances surrounding depositing them in my bank 
account and which formed the basis of the forgery charges. 
4. That affiant so advised said public defender that his mother overheard the 
conversation with Police Officer Scott Cosgrove and that affiant did not make any statment 
indicating he filled out any of the names or did anything on the check other than sign his own 
w & t * 
name and deposit it into his account. 
5. That a Pre-trial Conference was conducted on October 13, 1998 at which time 
affiant rejected any plea bargain. 
6. That affiant was incarcerated in the Box Elder County Jail at such time. 
7. That the trial date of November 10, 1998 which had previously been scheduled 
was confirmed and a jury trial was conduced on November 10, 1998. 
8. That between October 13, 1998 and November 10, 1998 the only contact my 
Public Defender attorney had with me was on the evening of November 9, 1998, the evening 
before the trial and that contact was by telephone. 
9. That affiant again indicated that James Robinson and Penny Soto were vital 
witnesses in his defense. 
10. That affiant previously told the public defender attorney of James Robinson being 
in the Box Elder County Jail and requested that he be served with a subpoena at that time for 
affiant did not know where said individual would be residing upon his release from jail. 
11. That James Robinson had in fact been released from jail and was not subpoenaed 
for trial the following day. 
12. That affiant also indicated that the signatures were not his and that he had not 
written anything on the check but his name when he deposited it into his account. 
13. That affiant's public defender attorney made no motions or requests that 
handwriting experts be appointed despite her knowledge that such issue was important to 
defending affiant. 
14. That affiant also advised said public defender attorney that his mother, Julia 
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Bosley, while not being present in the room with affiant and Officer Scott Cosgrove did overhear 
the conversation and could testify that affiant did not admit to signing the names on the checks 
as Officer Scott Cosgrove testified at trial. 
15. That affiant's mother, Julia Bosley, was called at trial but was not asked questions 
concerning overhearing the conversation. 
16. That Penny Soto appeared as a witness because my mother was able to get in 
contact with her and arrange for her to be there at the trial. 
17. That affiant believes his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to subpoena 
necessary witnesses, in failing to secure expert witnesses regarding the forgeries and in failing 
to discuss with affiant the issue of whether or not he should testify in his own behalf and the 
possible effect thereof. 
18. Affiant believes justice requires that he be granted a new trial with competent and 
effective counsel. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED thi^jT day of December, 1998. 
\i/J^ 
KEVIN A. BOSLEY 
Defendant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me tifls^L day of December, 1998 
CHEHYLL PETTY 
WOMPiMUC'irmatUTM 
oaomwHw 
^ •^r^ WPWb B f l i • ^ W » • 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit, postage 
prepaid, addressed as follows: / ^ ^ 9 ^^Q/' 
John Sorge 
Deputy Box Elder County Attorney 
01 South Main Street 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
•s . 
KEVIN A BOSLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
CASE NO. 971100120 FS 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Now that you have heard the evidence, we come to that part of the trial where you are 
instructed on the applicable law. 
I am required to read the instructions to you in open court. In addition, you will have 
these instructions in their written form in the jury room for use during your deliberations. 
Whether a Defendant is to be found guilty or not guilty depends upon both the facts and 
the law. 
As jurors, you have two duties to perform. One duty is to determine the facts of the case 
from the evidence received in the trial and not from any other source. The word "fact" means 
something that is proven directly or circumstantially by the evidence (or by agreement of counsel). 
Your other duty is to apply the rules of law as I state them to you, to the facts as you 
determine them, and in this way arrive at your verdict. 
It is my duty in these instructions to explain to you the rules of law that apply to this case. 
You must accept and follow the rules of law as I state them to you. 
As jurors you must not be influenced by pity for the Defendant or by prejudice against 
him. You must not be biased against the Defendant because he has been arrested for this offense, 
or because he has been charged with a crime, or because he has been brought to trial. None of 
these circumstances is evidence of his guilt and you must not infer or assume from any or all of 
them that the Defendant is more likely to be guilty than innocent. 
. r 
You must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice 
public opinion or public feeling. Both the State and the Defendant have a right to expect that you 
will conscientiously consider and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case, and that you 
will reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences of such verdict may be. 
INSTRUCTION NO. % 
The Information is a mere accusation or charge against the defendant and is not of itself 
any evidence of his guilt, and no juror in this case should permit himself to be to any extent 
influenced against the defendant because or on account of the Information. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
The Defendant has been charged by the State of Utah with the offenses of: 
COUNT I 
Forgery, Felony of the 3rd degree, at Brigham City, BoxJElder County, on or about July, 1997, 
in violation of Section 76-6-501, UCA (1953, as amended), to wit, the Defendant did on the date 
aforesaid with a purpose to defraud, utter a check in the amount of $5000 on which the name of 
the maker had been forged. 
COUNT II 
Forgery, Felony of the 3rd degree, at Brigham City, Box Elder County, on or about July, 1997, 
in violation of Section 76-6-501, UCA (1953, as amended), to wit, the Defendant did on the date 
aforesaid with a purpose to defraud, utter a check in the amount of $250 on which the name of 
the maker had been forged. 
INSTRUCTION NO- ^ 
You are instructed that the defendant has been charged by the State of Utah with the 
offence of Forgery, a Felony of the 3rd Degree. 
Before you can find the Defendant guilty of the offense of Forgery , a Felony of the 3rd 
Degree, you must find each of the following elements of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt: 
COUNT I 
1. That the Defendant, Kevin A. Bosley 
2. On or about July, 1997, at Brigham City, Box Elder County, Utah, 
3. Did with a purpose to defraud, 
4. Utter a check in the amount of $5000 
5. On which the name of the maker had been forged. 
If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the state has proved each of the 
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty of Forgery, 
a Felony of the 3rd Degree. 
If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the State has proved each of the 
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty of Forgery, 
a Felony of the 3rd Degree. 
INSTRUCTION NO. £ 
You are instructed that the defendant has been charged by the State of Utah with the 
offence of Forgery, a Felony of the 3rd Degree. 
Before you can find the Defendant guilty of the offense of Forgery , a Felony of the 3rd 
Degree, you must find each of the following elements of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt: 
COUNT II 
1. That the Defendant, Kevin A. Bosley 
2. On or about July, 1997, at Brigham City, Box Elder County, Utah, 
3. Did with a purpose to defraud, 
4. Utter a check in the amount of $250 
5. On which the name of the maker had been forged. 
If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the state has proved each of the 
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty of Forgery, 
a Felony of the 3rd Degree. 
If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the State has proved each of the 
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty of Forgery, 
a Felony of the 3rd Degree. 
INSTRUCTION NO. (p 
The burden rests upon the prosecution to establish every element of the crime with which 
the defendant is charged, and every element of the crime must be established beyond a reasonable 
doubt. If any one or more elements of the crime is not proved beyond a reasonable doubt then 
the defendant is entitled to be found not guilty. 
The defendant has no burden to either produce evidence or establish any fact. No burden 
is ever to be shifted to the defendant. 
INSTRUCTION NO- / 
A person engages in conduct intentionally, with respect to the nature of his conduct, or to 
a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or 
cause the result. 
A person engages in conduct knowingly, or with respect to his conduct or to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware 
that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Conduct means an act or omission. An 
act is a voluntary bodily movement. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ff 
You are instructed that in every crime or public offense there must be a union or joint 
operation of the act and intent. The intent or intention is manifested by the circumstances 
connected with the offense and the sound mind and discretion of the accused. 
INSTRUCTION NO- ^ 
It is not necessary that the Defendant's guilt should be established beyond any doubt or to 
an absolute certainty, but instead thereof that the Defendant's guilt must be established beyond a 
reasonable doubt as hereinafter defined. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ID 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof that satisfies the mind and 
convinces the understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. A reasonable 
doubt is not one that is merely possible, fanciful or imaginary, because most everything relating 
to human affairs is open to some possible doubt. But a reasonable doubt is one which is real and 
substantial: it is a doubt based upon reason and one which reasonable men and women would 
have upon a consideration of all of the evidence. It must arise from the evidence or the lack of 
evidence in the case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. // 
A person charged with a crime is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence is not a mere form to be disregarded by the 
jury at pleasure, but is a substantial, essential part of the law and is binding upon the jury. This 
presumption is a humane provision of the law, intended, so far as human agency is capable, to 
guard against the danger of an innocent person being unjustly punished. This presumption attends 
the defendant through every stage in the trial, and, if possible, you should reconcile the evidence 
with this presumption, and in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily 
shown, you should acquit the defendant. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12-
It is the province of the jury to award to the statements of the various witnesses the 
credence and weight to which in your judgment they may be entitled. In determining the 
credibility of any witness examined, it is your right to take into consideration his or her interest 
or feelings in regard to the outcome of the trial; his or her appearance or deportment while being 
examined; the possibility or probability of the truth of the statements of such witnesses as 
compared with other testimony given or fact established; his or her opportunities for observation 
or knowledge of the matter of which he or she testified; his or her friendly or unfriendly feeling 
toward either side, and generally those rules of ordinary experience and general observation by 
which intelligent persons decide as to controverted propositions of fact. It is a general principle 
of law that if a witness has willfully sworn falsely with respect to a material matter, the jury is at 
liberty to disregard the entire testimony of such witness, or if they find any part worthy of belief, 
either because of its inherent probability or because it is corroborated by other credible testimony 
they may accept such part and disregard the rest. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
You are instructed that defendant is a competent witness in his own behalf and has the right 
to go upon the witness stand and testify if he chooses to do so. However, the law expressly 
provides that no presumption adverse to him is to arise from the mere fact that he does not place 
himself upon the witness stand. If he is satisfied with the evidence which has been given, there 
is no reason for him to add thereto. 
In deciding whether or not to testify, defendant may choose to rely on the state of the 
evidence and upon the failure, if any, of the State to prove every element of the charge against 
him, and no lack of testimony on defendant's part will supply a failure of proof by the State so 
as to support by itself a finding against defendant on any such element. 
So, in this case, the mere fact that this defendant has not availed himself of the privilege 
which the law gives him should not prejudice him in any way. It should not be considered as any 
indication either of his guilt or his innocence. The failure of defendant to testify is not even a 
circumstance against him and no presumption of guilt can be indulged in the minds of the jury by 
reason of such a decision on his part. 
INSTRUCTION NO. N 
At times throughout the trial the Court has been called upon to pass on the question 
whether or not certain offered evidence might properly be admitted. With such rulings and the 
reasons for them you are not concerned. Whether offered evidence is admissible is purely a 
question of law, and from a ruling on such a question you are not to draw any inference as to what 
weight should be given the evidence, or as to the credibility of a witness. In admitting evidence, 
to which an objection is made, the Court does not determine what weight should be given such 
evidence. As to any question to which an objection was sustained, you must not conjecture as to 
what the answer might have been or as to the reason for the objection. 
INSTRUCTION NO. \g 
While you have a right to use your knowledge and experience as men and women in 
arriving at a decision as to the weight of the testimony and credibility of witnesses, yet your 
finding and decision must rest alone upon the evidence admitted in this trial. You cannot act upon 
the opinions and statements of counsel as to the truth of any evidence given or as to the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant. 
You must consider all of the evidence in connection with the law as given by the Court, 
and therefrom reach a verdict; in doing so you must, without favor or affection, bias, prejudice, 
or sympathy compare, weigh and consider all the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence 
with the sole, fixed and steadfast purpose of doing equal and exact justice between the State of 
Utah and the defendant at the bar. 
INSTRUCTION NO. It? 
The Court instructs the Jury that although the verdict to which each Juror agrees must, of 
course, be each Juror's own conclusion, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of fellow 
Jurors yet, in order to bring eight minds to a unanimous result the jurors should examine with 
candor the questions submitted to them, with due regard and deference to the opinions of each 
other. A dissenting Juror should consider whether their state of mind is a reasonable one, when 
it makes no impression on the minds of so many Jurors equally honest, equally intelligent, who 
have heard the some evidence, with an equal desire to arrive at the truth, under the sanction of 
the same oath. You are not to give up a conscientious conclusion after you have reached such a 
conclusion finally, but it is your duty to confer with your fellow Jurors carefully and earnestly, 
and with a desire to do absolute justice both to the State and to the Defendant. 
. i~ 
INSTRUCTION NO. If 
Upon retiring for deliberation, the Jury may take all papers and other items which have 
been received in evidence in the case. You also may take with you the written instructions given, 
and notes of testimony or other proceedings on the trial, taken by yourselves or any of you, but 
none taken by any other person. 
INSTRUCTION NO. \% 
When you retire to deliberate, you should appoint one of your number as a foreperson, 
who will preside over your deliberations. Your verdict must be in writing, signed by your 
foreperson, and when found, must be returned by you into court. 
In this case, it requires a unanimous agreement of all of the Jurors to find a verdict. 
A verdict form has been prepared and accompanies these instructions. 
Your verdict should be as your deliberations may result. 
I have dated and signed these instructions and you may take them with you to the jury 
room for further considerations, but I request that you return them into Court with your verdict 
so they may be filed in this case as required by law. 
Dated this the 10 day of November, 1998 
~^(MJ 
DISTRICT CC-tlRf JUD<#£ 
I 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
KEVIN A. BOSLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
VERDICT 
Case No. 9711000120 FS 
We the Jury, duly impaneled and sworn, find the Defendant: 
/ 
COUNT I 
Guilty of Forgery, a Felony of the 3rd Degree. 
Not Guilty of Forgery, a Felony of the 3rd Degree. 
COUNT II 
V Guilty of Forgery, a Felony of the 3rd Degree. 
Not Guilty of Forgery, a Felony of the 3rd Degree. 
Dated this the (0 day of November, 1998. 
Q^V^^NiS^l 
JURY F^EPERSON 
-7a //. M^ 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
